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The purpose of this paper is to provide a dating system for the Italian residential real estate market from 1927 to 2019 and investigate its interaction with credit and business cycles.

To detect the local turning point of the Italian residential real estate market, the authors apply the honeycomb cycle developed by Janssen et al. (1994) based on the joint analysis of house prices and the number of transactions. To this end, the authors use a unique historical reconstruction of house price levels by Baffigi and Piselli (2019) in addition to data on transactions.

This study confirms the validity of the honeycomb model for the last four decades of the Italian housing market. In addition, the results show that the severe downsizing of the housing market is largely associated with business and credit contraction, certainly contributing to exacerbating the severity of the recession. Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that whenever a price bubble occurs, it is coincident with the start of phase 2 of the honeycomb cycle.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that the honeycomb approach has been tested over such a long historical period and compared to the cyclic features of financial and real aggregates. In addition, even if the honeycomb cycle is not a model for detecting booms and busts in the housing market, the preliminary evidence might suggest a role for volume/transactions in detecting housing market bubbles.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a statistically significant relationship exists between environmental quality, as measured by consumption-related air pollution, and public debt in Europe. In addition, since the debt burden is one of the most important indicators of fiscal soundness within the European Union (EU) Treaty and the subsequent fiscal compact, the authors propose a simple test to determine whether participation in EU Treaties has shaped the empirical relationship between fiscal policy/public debt and environmental performance.

To this end, the authors built a panel data set that covers 24 European countries over the period 1996–2015.

The aspect that the authors want to underline is a possible trade off, which is confirmed in the empirical analysis, between the public finance equilibrium and the maintenance of a public good such as air quality. However, there are important non-linearities that shape the interaction between public debt and environmental pollution. Similarly, threshold effects arise when the authors examine the interaction between EU regulation and public debt and when the authors separately examine high debt and low debt countries. When the authors account for the stabilization rules introduced by EU Treaties, a negative effect on pollution is evident; in this way, fiscal consolidation limits the positive effect of fiscal policy.

The results point out the existence of a potential trade-off between the role of EU as a regulator aiming to mitigate environmental pollution, and its role within the Stability and Growth Pact. The analysis highlights that fiscal consolidation policies, while facilitating the achievement of macroeconomic stability within EU, might have a negative side effect on the environment quality, which spreads beyond the borders of one single country.

While a number of studies have suggested that fiscal spending might contribute to the level of pollution in European countries, there is scant evidence of the effect of public debt on environmental performance. This lack of scientific knowledge is a serious shortcoming, since it may allow for an underrepresentation of the wide-ranging consequences of stabilization programmes targeting the debt-to-GDP ratio, which could affect environmental quality.

This paper aims to focus on the banking crises recorded in Italy in the period 1861-2016 and to propose a novel classification based upon the timing of the crisis with respect to the business cycle.

A simple and objective rule to distinguish between slowdown and inner-banking crises is introduced. The real impact of banking crises is evaluated by integrating the narrative approach with an empirical vector autoregression analysis.

First, banking crises are not always associated to economic downturns. Especially in Italy, (but this analysis can be easily extended to other countries), they have often limited their negative effects within the financial system (“inner” crises). Second, the simultaneity of macroeconomic effects (credit contraction and GDP recession) leave the causal link undetermined. Third, the empirical and narrative analyses performed testify that boom–bust mechanisms are an exception in the panorama of (Italian) banking crises; although when the economy experiences such episodes, the economic and social consequences are not only severe but also enduring.

To classify historically recognized banking crisis episodes, the authors look at credit and GDP dynamics (and their ratio) around crisis years. Relying on a single definition of crisis is avoided. The classification provides an empirical rule to determine in what way banking crises differ. The classification is mostly based on the synchronization with the business cycle and, using the documented evolution of macroeconomic aggregates, it permits to highlight the fact that a variety of interactions occur between financial and real aggregates during and around banking crises.

As to the concept of systemic banking crisis, a qualitative judgment is often adopted to select relevant episodes, thus confirming the absence of a quantitative rule in classification criteria (Chaudron and de Haan, 2014). This paper proposes a simple and objective rule to distinguish between slowdown and inner-banking crises; the former occur close to a GDP contraction, whereas the latter appear to spread their effects with no substantial evidence of output loss.

Crime games cannot be simply read with mixed strategies. These strategies are inconclusive of how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, when considering the risk of non-compliance. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that in the presence of a small “private disturbance” of the players’ payoff, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played.

In tax-evasion games, an equilibrium must necessarily be interpreted in pure strategies, and the only way to do this is to insert some private information into the game and reinterpret it in a Bayesian scheme. We show that taxpayers’ private,subjective considerations on the effective implementation of the penalty and the revenue agency’s private information on the cost of monitoring and conviction can lead to Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. The present paper takes issue with this Bayesian equilibrium and the implications for comparative-statics results.

In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. The equilibrium strategies with incomplete information reveal whether it is convenient for the two agents to maintain their “private disturbance” as private information or, on the contrary, it is convenient to expect it to be “common knowledge.”

A distinct set of studies has adopted a game theoretic approach and shows that the standard economic approach to crime deterrence inspired by Gary Beker’s seminal paper might be flawed. See, among others, Saha and Poole (2000), Tsebelis (1989) and Andreozzi (2010). This paper shows that a greater severity of the penalty and a higher certainty of punishment (a lower possibility of appealing against sanctions and no discounts on due penalties) necessarily lead to a unique Bayesian equilibrium without evasion.

Magnetic fluid hyperthermia experiment requires a uniform magnetic field in order to control the heating rate of a magnetic nanoparticle fluid for laboratory tests. The automated optimal design of a real-life device able to generate a uniform magnetic field suitable to heat cells in a Petri dish is presented. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The inductor for tests has been designed using finite element analysis and evolutionary computing coupled to design of experiments technique in order to take into account sensitivity of solutions.

The geometry of the inductor has been designed and a laboratory prototype has been built. Results of preliminary tests, using a previously synthesized and characterized magneto fluid, are presented.

Design of experiment approach combined with evolutionary computing has been used to compute the solution sensitivity and approximate a 3D Pareto front. The designed inductor has been tested in an experimental set-up.